

large German population and Sudetenland Nazis demanded autonomy that was virtually granted by the Czech government. However, this did not satisfy the Nazis, and Germany began to demand that the Sudetenland be incorporated into Germany.

In September 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain negotiated directly with Hitler in a meeting in Munich with the leaders of France (Édouard Daladier) and Italy (Benito Mussolini). A peace treaty was signed between Britain and Germany, allowing Chamberlain on his return a famous photo opportunity, flourishing a paper and claiming "peace for our time." After more concessions to Germany, Britain finally declared war on September 3, 1939, after Germany had entered Poland 2 days earlier. The fate of the term *appeasement* was sealed.

The appeasement of Germany has been blamed on Chamberlain personally, but the policy was popular at the time, and historians now argue that there was little other course for Britain than to try to contain Hitler, though France and the United Kingdom could have taken a stronger line at certain times. Britain did rearm during the 2 years before the outbreak of war, so alongside appeasement went the policy of preparing for war. Modern historians thus look much more favorably on Chamberlain and his policies than did those in the immediate postwar period, though appeasement as a concept will probably never regain its once positive connotations.

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See also Balance of Power; Defensive Realism; Extended Deterrence; Fascism; Realism in International Relations

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ARENDT, HANNAH (1906–1975)

The political philosopher Hannah Arendt's conception of power is distinctive. It is rooted in a

political philosophy that celebrates the public realm of freedom that emerges when people act with others as citizens or political equals. Arendt believed power is actualized where people act together to sustain or to change the world they share with one another. Her fundamental claim is that power is consensual, referring to humans acting in concert. Power is never the property of an individual but of the groups acting together.

Arendt is quite self-conscious in rejecting standard assumptions about power, arguing that political scientists and theorists have obscured its nature ever since Plato. Regardless of political orientation, thinkers have assumed that the first question of politics is, "Who rules whom?" Arendt's rejection of this assumption may seem idealistic, utopian, or simply incredible. It is, however, offered by an author whose first major work was a three-volume study of totalitarianism, a work that entertains no illusions about violence, terror, and domination and that remains one of the landmarks of 20th-century political science. Nevertheless, in developing her account of power, Arendt firmly insists on James Madison's maxim, "All governments rest on opinion"—and not, therefore, on qualities that we more often associate with power, such as rulership or coercion. She even claims that violence is a "marginal phenomenon" in the political realm, which may look like a *reductio ad absurdum* of the claim that "opinion" forms the basis of government. Though seemingly eccentric, these claims are based on profound reflections about the nature of politics.

Arendt's basic criticism of the political science of her day concerned its failure to make distinctions. Accordingly, she distinguishes power from a series of concepts that political science often refers to under that name—violence, rulership, and authority (not to mention force and sheer strength). Although these concepts may appear functionally alike, inasmuch as each may involve one person doing something that another wants or expects that person to do, Arendt nonetheless discerns crucial differences. The next part of this entry considers her thoughts on power rather than violence, before turning to the more elusive notion of authority. (More elusive partly because Arendt's most obvious discussion of authority ["What is Authority?"] is largely historical and fits awkwardly with her later comments in "On Violence." This entry touches only on the latter.)

Arendt draws two main contrasts between power and violence. Although power is, in a sense that we will return to, “an end-in-itself,” violence is primarily instrumental. That is, violence is justified in human relations as a means to secure particular ends, and it is more justifiable as a means, the nearer and more certain those ends are. However, Arendt continually underlines the unpredictability of political action, violent and nonviolent, and the role played by sheer accident in human affairs. Thinking of Plato’s metaphors of rulership—the philosopher-king who “makes” the ideal republic as the crafts-person makes a table—she writes, “Since the end of human action, as distinct from the end products of fabrication, can never be reliably predicted, the means used to achieve political goals are more often than not of greater relevance to the future world than the intended goals” (1972, p. 106). Thus, Arendt does not deny that violence may have many effects on the political realm, but trenchantly observes that the most likely change violence makes is to a world where the exercise of violence becomes more usual. No matter how limited, strategic, or effective violence may be, its instrumentality sharply marks it off from power. “Far from being the means to an end, [power] is actually the very condition enabling a group of people to think and act in terms of the means-end category” (1972, p. 150). That is, there is power wherever people cooperate to pursue shared ends and wherever they address the question, What ends will we act in concert to pursue? As Arendt contends, any answer to the question, “To what end is power a means?” will either be vacuous (“to enable men to live together”) or dangerously utopian (“to promote happiness or to realise a classless society”—1972, p. 150f). Thus for Arendt, power does not call for any justification because it is bound up with the very existence of political communities.

A second key contrast: Arendt argues that power cannot be centralized whereas violence must be, if it is to be effective. Again, the point is easier to see with regard to violence. Unless it is to spell mayhem or warfare, violence requires a relatively small number of people to be tightly organized, who may then dominate others. Power, by contrast, arises where many people broadly share political goals, or invest authority in shared institutions, laws, or holders of political office. Of course, even the community that is most powerful in

Arendt’s terms—for instance, where government is seen as legitimate, where institutions remain alive through the combined initiative of many persons—employs violence. But this is as a sanction against lawbreakers, understood as criminals who enjoy no support among their fellow citizens. (Of course, violence also remains as a strategic means that may be used against those outside the community’s boundaries.) In this way, we can see why Arendt claims that violence is marginal to a political realm. Such limited uses of coercion are a far cry from systematic violence against those who are courageous or foolhardy enough to challenge a more or less tyrannical government—one that most subjects obey only for fear of coercive sanctions.

This second contrast has an important corollary. Violence will be the more necessary, the less a government enjoys the real consent of those governed. Arendt argues that violence becomes more tempting to rulers, the more they feel that support is ebbing away from their regimes and the less ready their “subjects” are to cooperate in their rule: “rule by sheer violence comes into play where power is being lost” (1972, p. 152). Although obedience may be obtained from the barrel of a gun, power—active support for a mode of government, its laws, and officeholders—cannot. Further, Arendt emphasizes that massive technological developments in the means of violence did not prevent the revolutions of the 20th century (nor did they decide the outcome of a war such as that in Vietnam). Rather, increasingly powerless rulers found that the arms changed hands and that armies and police forces no longer acted on their behalf. (Nicolae Ceaușescu’s fall in 1989 is exemplary here.)

Power in Arendt’s sense does not require unanimity of opinion—as she stresses, that is never to be found in human affairs. But it does require a consensus on certain goals, aims, or principles of organization, and the latter may give rise to authority. Despite the suspicion of utopianism sometimes felt by her readers, Arendt’s own examples of concerted action are entirely familiar to political science (and indeed, often involve the exercise or threat of violence): revolutionary uprisings (e.g., Hungary, 1956, and Czechoslovakia, 1968), the U.S. civil rights movement and the student movements of the 1960s, even the French resistance against the Nazis. Such movements are relatively short-lived, however. Consensus on constitutional

principles and modes of organization is a more durable and equally important source of power. In this case, common support invests laws and institutions with authority. Arendt stresses that such power and authority are compatible with a “division of powers”; indeed dividing power by checks and balances can actually be a source of power. Think, for instance, of the role a loyal opposition plays within representative democracy: power is kept alive through differences of opinion mediated by shared institutions that embody political authority. Arendt reinterprets the idea of a social contract—where political communities are understood as based on a contract among citizens—to stress the power that arises from mutual promise. Thus, a group of people may bind themselves to a constitution and associated institutions, as in one of her favorite examples from the American Revolution where she claimed power was understood consensually as reciprocity and mutuality rather than the power used by princes or aristocrats that is based on coercion.

In conclusion, recall the slogan that Arendt appropriates from Madison, “All governments rest on opinion.” This may, indeed, be the “opinion” of a small, well-organized minority or elite that uses systematic coercion to dominate others—in particular, to prevent others from acting together and hence gaining power to challenge the existing power structure. But concerted action and organization remain essential preconditions for the effective use of political violence. Thus, Arendt is adamant that although violence may destroy power, it can never become a substitute for it. At this fundamental level, even tyranny and totalitarianism rely on the power that arises from joint action—for example, by the apparatus of a secret police. Despite enormous variations in kind and degree, then, all forms of political community have the same basic requirements of power—which rests on shared opinion—and authority—which resides in shared institutions.

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See also Coercion and Power; Consensual Power, Theories of; Cooperation; Freedom

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ARGUMENT, POWER OF

Argument is the provision of reasons to justify a conclusion. One alternative is *bargaining* where the interested parties “cut a deal” so that they all satisfy at least some of their interests. Another alternative is *assertion*, where willfulness is sufficient justification for proposed action. Assertion goes straight to the conclusion, bypassing the process of justification. Why is justification important? The answer takes us to the power of argument: justification disconnects judgments of the legitimacy of the proposal from the quantum of power of the proposer (“do it or else”) and reconnects them to the qualitative merits of the proposal (“I accept your reasons”). This entry deals mainly with the public power of argument in managing social and political conflict, but says little about the pure power of logic or the framework of fallacies of bad argument treated in philosophical analysis.

Argument involves claims about evidence and usually stops short of conclusive demonstration. Argument is usually part of a process of debate with different sides contending for different propositions. The frequency of references to “a good argument” conveys this debating dimension to argument, with different sides contending “for” or